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Abstract: Decision making in practice varies from theoretical models and processes. Unpredictable 
and ill-structured operating conditions require dynamic resolution approaches underpinned by effective 
negotiation and decision making strategies to support collaborative work and partnerships. This short 
paper evaluates negotiation strategies and decision making approaches adopted to reach agreement for 
a unique Public-Private-Partnership. It examines how decision criteria were formulated and decision 
rules generated through negotiation process executions, and uncertainties addressed by adopting multi-
criteria and evidential reasoning approach. Findings are presented to help improve business 
performance in future PPPs by making effective decisions based on experience gained through past 
process executions.  
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1. Introduction 
 
Decisions are not always formally specified and optimised and often affect business performance, 
especially in rapidly changing and evolving environments characterised by high levels of 
uncertainty, volatility and ambiguity (Davies and Hobday, 2005). Unpredictable and ill-structured 
operating conditions require dynamic resolution approaches underpinned by effective decision 
making and creative problem solving to support collaborative work. Managers are under increasing 
pressure to deliver more with fewer resources, and this reality requires them to negotiate and make 
effective decisions in order to achieve, embed and sustain successful outcomes. This short paper 
evaluates negotiation strategies and decision making approaches adopted to reach agreement for a 
Public-Private-Partnership between London Underground Limited (LUL) and Heathrow Airport 
Limited (HAL), a subsidiary at the time of British Airports Authority Plc, to fund the Piccadilly 
Line Extension to Heathrow Terminal 5 (PiccExT5).  The case study spanned a period from 1991 
until 2004 when the contract was signed and the rail extension opened in 2008 in conjunction with 
Heathrow Terminal 5. The project is a truly unique PPP project, in that typically PPPs in the United 
Kingdom (UK) are governed by European Union Procurement and traditionally led by the public 
sector whereas with this case procurement was led by HAL alongside Heathrow Terminal 5’s other 
rail project.  Therefore, this case provides a source of rich data on which to explore decision-making 
and negotiations between the public and private sector on a major infrastructure project of 
significance to the UK economy. The project finance agreement is reviewed to understand how the 
contractual model was formed to develop the negotiated partnership. Decision and negotiation 
practices to reach agreement are correlated with theoretical approaches to understand the 
relationship between theory and practice during problem solving and while making rational 
judgements and choices. Findings are presented to help improve business performance in future 
PPPs by making effective decisions based on experience gained through past process executions.  
 
2. Air Travel at Heathrow 
 
Undoubtedly, international air travel is of major economic and political importance to the United 
Kingdom (UK); and in the South East, due to continued growth in air travel, Heathrow has needed 
to expand to meet this increased demand. In February 1993 British Airports Authority (BAA) Plc, 
who own the airport, submitted a planning application for a fifth air terminal on the western 
perimeter of the airport, costing £4.2 billion and that opened in Spring 2008 (Gannon & Snow, 
1998c; Gillagan, 2006).  BAA’s Terminal 5 was planned to handle 30 million air passengers per 
annum (mppa) at full capacity, and increase the usage of Heathrow Airport from 55 to 80 mppa 
delivering 55% growth (Elliot, 1995). Approximately 64 mppa were forecast to terminate their 
journey at Heathrow with the remainder inter-lining. In addition to this Heathrow is a major 
employer with approximately over 50,000 staff working in and around the airport ( Kirkup & 
Gannon, 1996).  Both BAA and LUL needed to know the current and future rail and airport demand 
as this was presented at the Heathrow Terminal 5 inquiry as part of the project’s Statement of Case. 
 
3. Rail Links to Heathrow Terminals 1, 2, 3 and 4 
 
Two direct rail services link Heathrow and London, the Heathrow Express (HEX) and London 
Underground Limited’s Piccadilly Line.   HEX offers a dedicated airport service operating 4 trains 
per hour with journey times to Paddington of 16 minutes from Terminals 1, 2, 3 (CTA) and 20 
minutes from Terminal 4 (T4).   HEX charges a premium fare and has attracted approximately 7 
million passengers per annum (mppa) a year in the early years of operation and will raise the mode 
share of public transport access to Heathrow to around 38% (Gannon et al., 1998).   With the 
Piccadilly Line typical journey times are 40 minutes to Green Park and 50 minutes to King’s Cross.  
The line is the single largest public transport carrier of air passengers to the airport, carrying some 
6.1 mppa in 1991, and accounts for 21% of the airport’s terminating air passengers, providing an 
important link to central London.    The line also attracts a large number of staff, escorts, visitors 
and others travelling to the airport.   Total usage, air and non-air passengers, for LUL of the 
Heathrow stations Central Terminal Area (CTA) and Terminal 4 (T4) amounted to 12.6 mppa in 
1991 and 13.8 mppa in 1995 (Kirkup & Gannon, 1996; LUL & BAA Plc, 1994).   
 
4. Rail Extensions to Heathrow Terminal 5 
 
Criticality of Public Transport 
Providing a high frequency service to central London is an important element of BAA’s public 
transport strategy.  BAA submitted a draft order under the Transport and Works Act (TWA) in 
September 1994 to extend HEX to Terminal 5 and jointly submitted a draft TWA order in November 
1994 to extend the Piccadilly line to Terminal 5.   BAA publicly indicated before the public inquiry 
that they wanted to increase the public transport share for air passengers from 30% to 50% (Kirkup 
& Gannon, 1996).    The introduction of Heathrow Express (HEX), its extension (HEX-Ex), and 
the Piccadilly Line Extension to Terminal 5 were essential if BAA’s vision was to be realised 
(Contract Journal, 1998; Kirkup et al., 1996).     The public transport mode share in 2003 to 
Heathrow, including HEX, was forecast to reach 37.5% and with the PiccExT5 36%; with Terminal 
5 itself the PiccExT5 was forecast to increase public transport mode share from 36% to 39.4% ( 
Kirkup & Gannon, 1996).  The PiccExT5 was forecast to carry more passengers than the Heathrow 
Express when non-air passengers such as those meeting air passengers and airport employees are 
included in LUL’s forecasts.    In 2010 the PiccExT5 was expected to handle approximately 3m 
passengers per year (TfL, 2005). Therefore the Piccadilly Line extension provided a significant 
contribution towards BAA achieving their ambitious public transport target for air passengers and 
those working at the airport (Gannon, 1998). 
 
 
Figure 1:  The Piccadilly line Extension and Heathrow Express Extension to Heathrow 
Terminal 5  
(LUL 1994) 
 
 
Configuration and Service Operations 
The Piccadilly Line and Heathrow Express extensions required 2.5 km of new underground twin 
tracks from Heathrow Terminals CTA station to a new joint station beneath the proposed Terminal 
5.   Figure 1 shows the layout of the Piccadilly Line and Heathrow Express railway at Heathrow 
and their proposed extensions to Terminal 5.   The Terminal 5 rail station is located in the basement 
of the concourse of Terminal and has six rail platforms: 2 for the Piccadilly line; 2 for Heathrow 
Express and 2 for future expansion to the west.  Heathrow Express will operate the Terminal 5 
stations (Airport Technology, 2008).  Both rail services are open for passenger services when 
Heathrow Terminal 5 opened on 27th March 2008.    During peak periods, the PiccExT5, will operate 
12 trains per hour (tph) between Central London and Heathrow splitting at Hatton Cross: 6 tph to 
Terminal 4 returning to Central London via CTA: and 6 tph to CTA onto Terminal 5 returning to 
from Terminal 5 to CTA (Tfl, 2007).   Heathrow Express passenger will travel to CTA and arrive 8 
minutes later at Terminal 5; passengers wishing to travel to Terminal 4 can change and CTA and 
board a free inter terminal transfer service (ATOC, 2007). 
 
5. PPP Agreement  
 
Initial Studies and Decision Approach 
During 1991 BAA approached LUL concerning the possibility of extending the Piccadilly Line to 
the proposed fifth terminal at Heathrow Airport. LUL undertook feasibility studies and concluded 
that an extension to Terminal 5 would be worthwhile with anticipated total benefits, including social 
benefits, exceeding the likely costs of construction and operation. A number of funding offers were 
proposed by BAA however these were not deemed viable by LUL and therefore a more 
collaborative approach was required to be undertaken by both parties to explore funding options 
and impacts.  An "in principle" decision to proceed with the extension by BAA and LUL Senior 
Managers was taken in March 1994, provided the project could be commercially justified for LUL. 
BAA and LUL then agreed a development agreement to jointly fund the development works of the 
project. During the early part of 1994 further feasibility studies were undertaken jointly by BAA 
and LUL to assess the viability of the project. In addition to these studies LUL and BAA undertook 
feasibility design and development of a joint draft Order application, under the Transport and Works 
Act (TWA), to enable the project to be progressed alongside Terminal Five itself. The draft Order 
application was jointly submitted by LUL and BAA on 29th November 1994.  
 
The above “in principle” decision agreed between BAA and LUL highlighted the nature of phased 
decision making processes between the two partners. The initial divergent and exploratory phase 
generated alternative solutions where decision maker’s personal style and experiential subconscious 
played a role to develop new solutions. The phase corresponded to the design phase on Simon’s 
(1977) model of rational decision making where possible courses of action are developed, and the 
multiple perspectives approach suggested by Mitroff and Linstone (1993). The development 
agreement lacked complete availability of data that required feasibility studies to be undertaken, 
and was based on the random nature of decision attributes that evolved during the initial negotiation 
processes. Both partners were able to work towards a reduced subset of feasible solutions where the 
outcomes exceeded expected criteria for initial decision attributes if the project was commercially 
justified. The early stage decision approach for the “in principle” agreement was similar to the 
evidential reason method discussed by Xu and Yang (2001) that aggregates outcomes from lower 
level attributes to higher level attributes during the negotiation process.  
 
The Principles of the Agreement 
From spring 1996 onwards BAA and LUL worked intensely to develop funding for the extension 
with the objective of finding a solution that was acceptable to both parties and would enable the 
Piccadilly Line extension to be operating at the opening of Terminal 5.  It was considered essential 
by LUL that any contribution it made towards the capital costs did not exceed the net income 
generated by the extension only for LUL by Terminal 5 after additional operating costs were 
incurred.  Furthermore it was important for LUL that any funding proposal considered the 
significant investment at the existing Heathrow stations that LUL was undertaking ultimately to 
satisfy the needs of BAA’s airport customers.   LUL and BAA Senior Managers agreed to share 
forecast data and analysis to analyse funding options, sensitivities and scenarios.   This meant that 
two business case perspectives were needed for decision-making: LUL’s public sector social benefit 
(non-financial) and value for money business cases; and BAA’s private sector business case that 
determined their Internal Rate of Return post tax nominal (IRR).  These extended agreements 
correspond to the later convergent phase of exploring options based on differing perspectives of the 
context of the project, motivation of partners, and availability of information suggested by Russo 
and Schoemaker (2002). Towards the end of 1996 BAA and LUL finally reached an agreement to 
fund and extend the Piccadilly Line into Heathrow Airport Terminal 5, on the condition the 
proposed Terminal 5 and extension gained approval by the inspector.     
 
Project Agreements 
BAA and LUL then produced a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) that outlined the principles 
of the deal was signed between the two parties.     From the MOU a formal Project Agreement was 
then developed.    On March 20th 1998, during the preparation of the project’s contractual 
agreement, LUL’s PPP was announced by the Deputy Prime Minister, John Prescott (Gannon et al., 
1998).  This announcement had a major funding implication for LUL and for the PiccExT5 project 
and in 2000 parts of the project agreement needed reviewing to accommodate the PPP and to 
improve risk transfer.   After another round of negotiations taking a further two years the contract 
was signed between BAA and LUL in August 2004.    The main revision to the funding principles 
were that LUL had 100% revenue risk transfer to BAA compared to the MOU signed in 1996 that 
provided a 30% of revenue risk transfer.  This change facilitated a strong ‘off-balance’ sheet 
requirement needed for PPP projects approval by Central Government. 
 
Outline of the Deal 
BAA funded the construction costs for the extension.  LUL made a contribution to these costs in 
the form of the project’s incremental gross margin on a passenger levy basis between a period of 
25 to 30 years after the start of services to the new terminal (Kirkup & Gannon, 1998).    BAA also 
provided a significant capital contribution to London Underground for upgrading facilities at 
Heathrow Central stations Terminals 1,2, and 3 (CTA) and undertake improvements to train 
services by 2006/7 (Gannon et al., 1997).   With the PiccExT5 contract Tubelines Ltd were 
responsible for implementing the signals and providing two additional trains (Gannon, 2016).   
Three of LUL’s existing PFI contractors were responsible for providing and maintaining power, 
ticketing and communications equipment.  BAA’s contractors were responsible for providing the 
station box, tunnels and track.   
  
6. The Planning Inquiry and Terminal 5 Approval  
 
The Heathrow Terminal 5 Planning Inquiry started on 16th May 1995 and finished on 17th March 
1999, lasting 3 years and 10 months and costing BAA £64m and Central and Local Government 
£17m (DfT, 1999).  During the inquiry BAA stated that it did not view the extension of the 
Piccadilly Line as necessary to support Terminal 5 because their technical evidence showed the 
impacts of Terminal 5 were acceptable with the Heathrow Express extension.   However BAA did 
indicate the extension of the Piccadilly Line to Terminal 5 (T5) would clearly be advantageous in 
providing a wider choice of Public Transport services for passengers.  London Transport’s (LT), 
now Transport for London (TfL), response in the statement of case was, “LT believes that it would 
be a serious omission if the line was not extended from Heathrow Terminals 1,2,3 station to 
Terminal five as part and parcel of the proposed development and opened for service at the same 
time as the Terminal itself”.      
 
On 20th November 2001 the Secretary of State for Transport, Local Government and Regions 
(DTLR) announced in the House of Commons, “I have today given my approval to the development 
of Terminal 5 at Heathrow airport.  Such a development is in the national interest.  It will enable 
Heathrow to remain a world-class airport, and it will bring benefits to the British economy”, (HC, 
2001). On the 26th March 2002 the Secretary of State announced an imposed condition that 
Terminal 5 could not open prior to the PiccExT5 and Hex-Ex being provided before the core 
terminal building was open. This was to control railway development at Heathrow Terminal 5, as 
surprisingly these conditions had not been discussed at the inquiry (DTLR, 2002).  
 
7. Findings  
 
Decision making in practice varies from theoretical models and processes. Turpin and Marias 
(2004) studied the literature on decision making to compare the way managers make decisions in 
practice, and concluded seasoned decision makers do not rely on formal decision support tools to a 
large extent. Indeed decision making context along with personal styles and agendas of decision 
makers influence the nature of decision making processes and project outcomes. Decision making 
processes are often compromised when team members fall victim to the fallacy where benefits are 
overestimated and costs are underestimated (Flyvbjerg, 2008; Cantarelli et al, 2010). The case study 
highlighted that joint-working between the public-private partners required mutual consideration of 
motivation, work process strengths and weaknesses to ensure managers were clearly able to identify 
requirements and capabilities for targeted work processes, predict resources, optimise performance, 
and realise outcomes, (Mitchell and Zmud, 1999). The act of negotiation facilitated integration of 
interests, expectations, and perspectives and enabled managers to develop common understanding 
of aims and objectives, and the means to reach those objectives, (Reich and Benbasat, 1996). 
Integration was realised by synthesising varying expectations and expertise during negotiation and 
decision-making processes enabling views of both partners to be incorporated. Different sets of 
assumptions about optimal ways to proceed were considered by prioritising different values and 
perspectives, and were integrated in the process to develop required solutions.  
 
Moreover, the BAA and LUL agreement demonstrated an approach of formulating decision criteria 
as decision rules were generated and developed through negotiation process executions suggested 
by Ghattas et al (2013). As negotiations progressed, managers were able to build on actual process 
paths followed and decisions made, along with taking into account context of each situation detailed 
above along with decision process executions. The negotiation processes and decision executions 
helped achieve business performance for both partners while addressing conflict of multiple criteria. 
The private partner’s criteria were based on its transport strategy pf providing high frequency 
service to the city centre, while outcomes of the feasibility study provided the public partner 
confidence that the extension project would be worthwhile with anticipated total benefits, including 
social benefits, exceeding the likely costs of construction and operation. Partner perceptions 
combined with negotiation and decisions sought to find satisfying and ideal solutions in a multi-
criteria decision making and evidential reasoning approach as suggested by Xu and Yang (2001). 
The approach addressed uncertainties such as absence of data, incomplete description of decision 
attributes, and random and evolutionary nature of attributes during the public-private negotiated 
agreement. Thus BAA and LUL were able to reach agreement by developing attributes for criteria 
as the dynamic process of negotiation evolved. 
 Additionally, the complexities and unpredictability of unstructured situations required effective 
decision-making and creative problem solving to ensure successful outcomes as proposed by Munns 
and Bjeirmi, (1996). Negotiations during PPP development processes enabled managers to adopt 
new and innovative approaches to integrate perspectives and resolve issues. Decisions were based 
on negotiated shared contexts and interpretations created through common understanding of 
interests and expectations in changing situations as discussed by Simon (1977) and Nutt (1989). 
BAA and LUL mobilised and utilised the knowledge and heuristic judgement of experienced 
managers to address mutual considerations and integration of alternatives, interests, and 
expectations, (Sandhawalia and Dalcher 2017). Making decisions on the basis of managers’ 
experience is especially complex as there is need for discussion and negotiation between 
stakeholders to evaluate issues and frame an agenda for shared context and understanding, (Garcia-
Penalvo and Conde, 2014). During negotiation BAA and LUL started from positions of initial 
interest and recognised the possibility of different outcomes, and accordingly tried to ensure that 
risk activities were directed towards making an acceptable set of outcomes more likely. Common 
understanding allowed both parties to appreciate the ‘many acceptable futures’ proposition and 
manage risk to produce the changes needed to achieve acceptable outcomes. The findings of this 
case study have implications for PPPs regarding their ability to manage context and frame an agenda 
during the negotiation process to make informed decisions.  
8. Conclusion   
 
The above PPP agreement was reviewed to understand how the contractual model was formed to 
develop the negotiated partnership. The long and protracted decision and negotiation processes of 
developing the PPP from initial offer to contract signature is correlated with theoretical approaches 
to understand how rational judgements and choices were made and issues resolved. The process 
was long principally due to: delays in LUL and BAA reaching an agreement, the necessary re-
working of the forecast components; lack of LT Board agreement with the principle of negotiating 
a contract with BAA; and organisational changes within LUL and its environment due to the PPP. 
In other words, the process required an integration of interests, expectations and perspectives to 
develop common understanding of aims and objectives, and the means to reach those objectives. 
Time was required to address uncertainties caused by absence of data, incomplete information and 
description of decision criteria, and evolutionary nature of attributes during the negotiation process. 
The examined period provides insights to negotiation strategies and decision approaches of both 
partners, and the outcomes have implications for future PPPs as despite the many complexities of 
reaching agreement, the PiccExT5 provides passengers with a cheaper alternative albeit a longer 
direct route into Central London from the new Terminal. Further work includes developing a multi-
criteria decision making framework that addresses partner interests and expectations, and helps 
frame and agenda and formulate decision attributes to help guide the development of agreements in 
future private sector driven PPPs. 
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